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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
TomRis-INrAL RECOcNrrON OF RIGHT OF PRIVAcY-ALLEGATION
OF PUBLICATION UNNECESsAiY To MAiNTAiN AcroN.-P alleged that
before she rented an apartment from D, he caused to be installed
therein a listening device connected with a speaker in his office, by
means of which he listened to P's private and confidential conversa-
tions. D demurred to this declaration. Held, reversing the trial
court's decision which sustained the demurrer, that the right of pri-
vacy, including the right to keep private one's communications, is a
right which gives rise to an action for damages, and it is unnecessary
to state in the declaration that special damage resulted, or that there
was a publication of information obtained through the invasion.
Roach v. Harper, 105 S.E.2d 564 (W. Va. 1958).
Tort liability resulting from the invasion of another's privacy is
comparatively new, evolving in this country not from judicial opin-
ion, but from a law review article. Warren & Brandeis, The Right of
Privacy, 4 HA.v. L. REv. 193 (1890), recognized that the law had
long protected a right to privacy, as a personal right, but had done
so under the more familiar concepts of property rights, implied con-
tractual rights, and confidential relationships. Because of this, they
advocated that the right of an individual to be let alone, to be free
from unwarranted and unauthorized publication of his pictures,
name, and stories concerning his personal affairs, when such publi-
cation was made for commercial purposes, should be recognized by
the courts as one capable of legal enforcement, without waiting for
the legislative branch of government to solve the problem.
The doctrine thus advocated was the subject of much discussion,
and was not everywhere accepted. One of the earliest leading deci-
sions which rejected the right was Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). The court refused to
enjoin the use of an individual's picture for commercial purposes, and
used the reasoning that to do so would lead to a flood of litigation
and thus reduce the doctrine to absurdities. The decision, however,
proved so unpopular that the legislature almost immediately enacted
a statute which prohibited the use of a living person's name or pic-
ture for purposes of advertisement. N. Y. CivIm RIGHrs LAw §§
50-51. Decided two years later was the landmark case that recog-
nized the right of privacy. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co.,
122 Ga. 1.90, 50 S.E. 68 (1905), allowed recovery in a similar fact
situation to the Roberson case, supra. The court said that the ab-
sence of precedent was not conclusive in the determination of the
right of privacy, but that a person had the right to exist, and that this
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was invaded by a deprivation of things necessary to the enjoyment
of life. This included the right of one to order his life and his affairs
in a manner most agreeable to him, so long as this did not violate the
rights of others.
While situations have not arisen in all jurisdictions which in-
volve decisions as to whether a right of privacy exists, the majority
of states in which the issue has been raised indicate that this right
will be protected. It has been suggested by one text writer that the
right exists in twenty states, and indications are -that it will be
recognized in nine more, while only three states have completely re-
jected the doctrine. PnossER, ToRTs 636 (2d ed. 1955).
The principal case is one of first impression in this jurisdiction,
and our court, after a review of both primary and secondary authori-
ties, recognized the right of an individual to be let alone, and to live
a life of seclusion which is free from unwarranted publicity-each
person is entitled to a right of privacy. In so doing, the court was
forced by the fact situation to do more than recognize this right, and
by its decision has advanced the doctrine beyond the original con-
templation of Warren and Brandeis. The usual case which poses
the issue involves an unauthorized invasion of privacy by means of
a publication or commercialization of some element of one's person-
ality or his name. The most common situation, and the one most
easily reconcilable with the original reason for the establishment of
the tort is the using of one's picture for advertisment. E.g., Conti-
nental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 648, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1949);
Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d 488 (1941). In
their article, Warren & Brandeis, supra, recognized this, saying that
because of innovations in mechanical means of reproduction, the
press had made an unwarranted invasion into the secret precinct of
private and domestic life.
Almost in the same breath, these two writers recognized that
the fact situation of the principal case would be likely to arise, say-
ing that ". .. numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good
the prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be pro-
claimed from the house-tops.' " Warren & Brandeis, upra at 195.
But in the limitations placed on the doctrine, they say "... the law
would probably not grant any redress for the invasion of privacy by
oral publication in the absence of special damage.. .", reasoning that
the injury from such communications would be so trifling that it
might well be disregarded. Warren & Brandeis, supra at 217. (Em-
phasis added.) Combining these statements, it would seem that
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the concept of the right of privacy would recognize a tortious inva-
sion of listening to the private conversations of another, but would
allow no recovery without a written publication or commercializa-
tion of the information thus obtained.
Therein lies the problem of the principal case, where a good
cause of action was held to exist without an allegation of special dam-
ages or publication. The question thus arises as to whether this is
a valid extension of the doctrine, and if so, should the doctrine thus
extended have any limitations placed on it?
Where there has been a publication of information gained by
the wrongful invasion, cases are uniform in holding that it is not
necessary to allege or prove that special damages resulted. E.g.,
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., supra. The fact that the
damages are difficult to measure (the right of privacy having no
pecuniary standard) is of no consequence as a bar to recovery.
Rhodes v. Graham, 288 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931).
In certain situations, the fact that the person who has invaded
the privacy of another has not disclosed the means or results of his
violation will not prevent an action therefor. McDaniel v. Atlanta
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1989), is per-
haps the leading authority for this proposition. In this case a listen-
ing device was placed in a private hospital room and it recorded
numerous private conversations of the patient with her family and
friends. This conduct was held to be an intrusion just as effective
as if the individual had been in the room. The contention of the de-
fense that the essence of the cause of action was publication was
dismissed by the court, saying that in situations such as this, the pri-
vacy was invaded even though the information was restricted to the
immediate transgressor, and although publication would aggravate
the damages, it was not necessary to recovery for the invasion.
One has the legal right to enjoy social and business relations
with his family, friends, and neighbors, and is entitled to converse
with them without intrusion by another. This was recognized in
Rhodes v. Graham, supra. There, damages were allowed where a
device had been used to listen to telephone conversations, the re-
covery being based on a right of privacy. The absence of publica-
tion of the conversations or their results had no effect as a bar to
recovery.
In conclusion, because of the existing law covering the fact
situation, and a sense of justice determined by the mores and ethics
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of a modem society, it is felt that the decision reached in the princi-
pal case is correct. It is submitted, however, that by a recognition of
the existence of a right of privacy, the court will not in all cases per-
mit a recovery in the absence of publication of the wrongfully
gained material. It was necessary in this case to establish such a
right in the plaintiff without a publication by the defendant, for if
this had not been done, a privilege to willfully eavesdrop, with im-
munity therefor, would have been granted. Thus a justifiable result
was reached in the principal case by giving primary consideration to
the protection of the plaintiff.
M. D. W., Jr.
Wozmdnm's ComYEcsAnoN-INjulY ARsiNG OUT OF AMD n T E
Cou sE OF Em Tonum'r.-Deceased was employed by a tractor re-
pair company. The owner of the company had an informal under-
standing with his employees that help was to be given by the em-
ployees to any motorist they found in distress on the highways, in
the belief that this would indirectly help his business, in that other
motorists would help his drivers if the need arose. Deceased, while
driving a company truck in performance of his duties, stopped to
assist a fellow trucker in difficulty. He was attempting to warn on-
coming motorists with a flashlight when he was struck and killed by
an approaching truck. The widow asks payment under the state
workmen's compensation statute. Held, affirming the lower court,
that the injury and death resulted from an accident arising out of
and occurring in the course of employment. U.S. Fidelity & Guar-
anty Co. v. Harlin, 105 S.E.2d 481 (Ga. 1958).
GA. CODE tit. 114, § 102 (1935), states that for an injury to come
under that state's workmen's compensation statute, the injury must
result from an accident "arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment"
The problem raised by the principal case and the applicable
section of the Georgia Code is one which is extremely easy to isolate
and pose, and just as difficult to resolve. It may be stated quite
simply: When does an injury arise out of and in the course of em-
ployment? The majority of jurisdictions in this country have statu-
tory provisions similar to that of Georgia, if not in form, at least in
substance. Interpretation of these statutes has given rise to a multi-
tude of cases in which the courts have attempted to formulate some
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